War Goals and the Ukraine War: Seeing this War in a Different Way May Happen, but it Has to be Part of a Broader Way of Dealing with Russia
American Eclectic posts articles twice a month, on the 1st and 15th. This is the second year of publication; previously published articles can be found on my site.
September 15, 2023
An exchange before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took place in January between Senator Rand Paul (R. KY) and Victoria Nuland, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs addressed the issue of when and how will the Ukraine War end. Some of this exchange went as follows:
SENATOR PAUL: Ms. Nuland, when you went to Moscow in October of 2021 you were only allowed to go because there was a negotiation in advance of that where we agreed to take sanctions off of a Russian individual and Russia agreed in tandem to take sanctions off of you. I have had this discussion for quite a while. We have sanctions on 25 members of the Duma, mostly for political reasons because they have politically spoken out against U.S. interests, but they are, of course, Russians. They also, in turn, sanction us as well. So 25, 30 members of Congress are sanctioned as well. Do you favor or oppose some sort of arrangement similar to your arrangement where sanction removal was traded to enhance diplomacy.
MS. NULAND. Senator Paul, in the context of a Russian decision to negotiate seriously and withdraw its forces from Ukraine and return territory, I would certainly favor and I believe Secretary [of State Antony] Blinken would also favor sanctions relief in that context.
SENATOR PAUL. I do not think hardly taking off sanctions on a member of the Duma is going to be traded for the end of the war. I mean, I wish it were that easy. What I am talking about is allowing members of their Duma, many of whom may be favorable to our country, to travel to our country, and vice versa. I am talking about diplomatic legislative exchange. I am not talking about trading it for peace. I am sure that would be great, but I do not think that is really on the table, trading—removing sanctions on Senator [James] Risch [R. ID] for peace. I wish that were important enough, but I do not know that that is going to happen. That is what I am talking about. I am talking about very small, incremental removal of sanctions on legislative members in exchange for them doing the same. …We only have sanctions on 25 or 30, but I would venture to say every member of the Duma probably supports Crimea. I am not saying it is right. I am just saying this is their perspective, and if we are going to sanction people for their belief and their sort of nationalist version of the world, then we will not have any discussion between people or any legislative exchange.
MS. NULAND. Senator, I would say that if it is in U.S. interest for there to be conversations with Russians, we should look hard at what can be done to facilitate those [conversations].
SENATOR PAUL. I would argue that it is. There has been a great deal of discussion about prosecutions. Let us drag people to The Hague. Let us have some prosecutions. Would Putin be one of those targets?
MS. NULAND. Senator, [Vladimir Putin] is certainly guilty of prosecuting war crimes. He is certainly the leader of this illegal aggression.
SENATOR PAUL. It sounds like the Administration would favor taking him to The Hague?
MS. NULAND. [W]e are now looking with our allies and partners and the Ukrainians at the appropriate judicial mechanism and that would indicate the scope of what would be covered.
SENATOR PAUL. If you are really thinking ultimately that there might be a peaceful settlement that does not involve unconditional surrender by the Russians, or vice versa by the Ukrainians, you might at least put some thought into the fact that saying that he is guilty of war crimes and that it is a possibility he is going to The Hague, that it may make any kind of settlement—peaceful settlement or someone who is fighting a war less likely to prosecute.
I think you are basically saying this war is going to go on forever and with—if you want to picture devastation—you see Ukraine now, in 5 years it will be worse. I mean, I do not imagine this getting better over the next 5 years, but if you preclude peace I think you inevitably will make it worse.
How do wars end? Eventually the Ukraine War will end but one gets the impression that there is not enough public discussion about this issue, which is bad, since it can contribute to an endless, almost open-ended, warfare that only is escalating. The increasing frequency and effectiveness of Ukraine drone attacks at targets within Russia makes one wonder if the battlefield is defined as only Ukraine territory will change as more drone attacks continue inside Russia. One of the fears of any war is that they can escalate to newer, higher levels. This exchange contains within it some the aspects that will be associated with the war ending.
Within this exchange there are two issues raised related to the issue of the war ending. First, who is talking to whom and who matters. Nuland is correct that “we will not have any discussion between people or any legislative exchange”: Exactly what we do not want. Somewhere in future memoirs which will be written by members of the Biden Administration, we may then get an idea of what was going on behind the scenes between Russia and the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Ukraine, and the United States. The United States is a member of NATO but since there appears to be mounting tensions within the European members of the alliance about support for Ukraine then the United States might be approaching discussions with Russia and Ukraine with some daylight developing between NATO and the United States. Second, from reading Nuland’s comments, the issue of prosecuting Putin could be on the table as a bargaining issue. The International Criminal Court (the United States is not a member of the ICC) is set to prosecute Putin for taking Ukrainian children back to Russia and issued an arrest warrant against Putin. This is a heinous issue but is there a possibility this pending trial could be put on hold, if such an action contributes to ending the fighting, the killing. Can the return of children taken be addressed separated from a trial before the ICC.
This is only one issue woven into the entirety of the war. The Ukrainian territory held by Russia—particularly Crimea, raises the issue of whether Ukraine might be pressured to accept a stalemate. A stalemate that resembles the ongoing Korean War, that many assume ended in 1953 but, essentially, all that happened was that the fighting stopped and the war, technically, still is continuing. At the Singapore Summit in 2018, between former President Donald Trump and North Korean leader, Chairman Kim Jong Un, the issue of an “end-the-war declaration” appeared to be on the table but then disappeared.
A Korean War model could possibly be one approach to ending the fighting. In this case, would a demilitarized border zone, like the 2.5 miles that separates North and South Korea at the 38th Parallel be established. This appears to run counter to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s clear goal to retake Crimea. But here we are in November 2023, 19 months since the war began, I have to wonder if we reach 38 months, will attitudes emerge that are decidedly different than what the prevailing attitudes are now.
Reports seem to place Ukrainian successes at different points along the fighting front. But if a picture emerges 19 months from now that fighting along a broad front begins to resemble Erich Maria Remarque’s 1929 novel, All Quiet on the Western Front, which addressed the conditions German soldiers endured in trench warfare against Western forces during the First World War, then will the United States and NATO begin to put pressure on Ukraine to approach their war goals differently. Statements now of breakthroughs or advances, or retaking positions previously held by Russian forces, can give way to different thinking about how to end the war if battlefield lines look somewhat the same 19 months from now.
Bruce Catton, best known for his books on the American Civil War, addressed the issue of war goals changing during that war in America Goes to War: The Civil War and its Meaning in American Culture. Catton saw the Civil War as the first modern war and while he addressed technology and battlefield tactics, that war goals changed as the war progressed is a main feature of this book. Where the Abraham Lincoln administration stood as the war began in 1861 was not where they were several years later. Catton reflected on this point, wondering if Lincoln had seriously thought the war would eventually lead to the end of slavery when those first shots were fired by the South on Fort Sumter.
Whatever is going on with the United States, NATO and involving Ukraine regarding how they see the trajectory of the war, also needs to consider whatever is developing on the Russian side and Valdimir Putin’s current state of mind but also where he might be 19 months from now. Two articles published a day apart in February on two different news sites (Aljazeera and the Wilson Center) demonstrate the confusion about where Putin currently stands. In the Ajazeera piece, seven different knowledgeable individuals gave a collective impression of slogging ahead with expectations of more of the same fighting to come. A Russian journalist stated, “I think that judging by how things are going, we’re definitely going to live through another year of war. … [F]or now it’s obvious, based on what our sources say, a truce is impossible. Russia is still trying to advance, Ukraine doesn’t want to surrender. It doesn’t look as though things will calm down or take a pause.” In the Wilson Center piece, a Ukrainian military officer wrote, “the war that began as an intention to stop NATO expansion and seize control of Ukraine is now being fought over a few regions that have no strategic value for Russia except as a land corridor to Crimea.” He concluded:
[P]robably Putin will keep changing [his] goals, depending on his luck at the front. The bravery of Ukrainians and the solidarity of the West have forced him to shrink his initial, outsized goals. But there can be no doubt: if Russian forces achieve some military successes, the Putin’s megalomania will return, and the war’s goals will be reviewed again. Therefore, it is incumbent on the West to do its best to make Putin fail and leave him with a single goal: getting out of Ukraine.
Where will these war analysts be in another 19 months. The types of weapons systems that Ukraine requests and the back and forth over whether they will get them, which gives way to Ukraine getting some of what they want, adds to a picture of a dynamics that a significant change of where the war is currently, will be decidedly different next year or the year after. Combine that with Zelenskyy’s moves to root out corruption within the Ukrainian government, add in the give and take between Congress and the Biden administration over how to address America’s oversight of the aid we are giving Ukraine, throw in the internal strains among the different NATO countries and where they stand and we see a fluid situation now with the anticipation of an improved situation for Ukraine next year or the one after that. But what if we get to that near-term future and instead a merry-go-round image emerges. At what point does something change that leads to different war goals by Ukraine and a clear war goal by Putin that is distinctly different than where he is now.
Karl von Clausewitz, who fought in the Napoleonic Wars and addressed his observations in his famous treatise, On War, after the wars ended, wrote:
The first, the highest and most decisive act of judgment the statesman and commander make is to understand correctly the kind of war they are undertaking and not to take it for, nor wish it to be, something that, by the nature of the circumstances, it cannot be.
Ukraine and with it the United States and NATO are engaging in a war to restore Ukraine to where it was prior to 2014 when Russia occupied Crimea. Putin is focused still on occupying Ukraine; beyond the territory he holds along the eastern side of the country. The beginning of this war last year with Russia’s invasion is still fresh in the minds of both sides. The farther we get from having a clear picture of that beginning, the more the type of war this is seen as can change. Neither side will be comfortable with seeing this war as a war of attrition which simply becomes a meatgrinder leading to more deaths. I, as well as many, hope that Ukraine can make all the breakthroughs it hopes to achieve and drive Russia out of Ukraine completely. For now, that noble goal holds sway. If in another 19 months we are measuring success in slight changes on the battlefield and saying the next offensive will be the one that completely changes the course of the war, will policymakers emerge who see the war differently and adjust how they see this war. Anything that looks like Putin winning something is not a good place to be. The frustration with that type of assessment, however, can be countered with a broader way of clearly articulating that for many countries, the optimism that came with the end of the Cold War with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, has been replaced with a renewed focus that Russia is clearly a hostile power that needs to be countered.
Related to any reassessment of this war, Elon Musk must be included in that review. Ukraine has relied on Musk’s Starlink satellite communications system. Musk decided to play a role in this war by preventing, or limiting, his system from being used by Ukraine to attack Russian ships in the Black Sea. Ukraine has sunk and damaged Russian ships in the Black Sea, but Musk’s interference has limited the amount of destruction that Ukraine could have done to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Musk can lie to himself that he was making some type of decision to avoid Putin using nuclear weapons, but he made a decision that was supportive of Russia. He further showed his support for Russia by proposing that in any peace agreement Ukraine had to agree to not join NATO. A commercial satellite system with the personal whims of its owner playing the role of a battlefield commander must be included in understanding where this war is headed.
War goals change, the expected in a war. Unlike how the United States and NATO accepted the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 and its aftermath where Russia still controls twenty percent of Georgian territory and saw the war and the current situation as little more than a blip on a radar screen in Western-Russian relations, this war is different. Ukraine should be in NATO and the war must be part of a broader strategy by both the United States and NATO that Russia as a threat to the West is here to stay.
Notes
Victor Andrusiv, “Putin’s War of Vanishing Goals,” Wilson Center (February 21, 2023): https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-war-vanishing-goals
Bruce Catton, America Goes to War: The Civil War and its Meaning in American Culture (Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 1992).
Countering Russian Aggression: Ukraine and Beyond, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 118th Congress, 1st Session (January 26, 2023): https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-118shrg52759/pdf/CHRG-118shrg52759.pdf
Antulio Echevarria II, “War’s Changing Character and Varying Nature: A Closer Look at Clausewitz’s Trinity,” Infinity Journal, Volume 5, Issue 4 (Summer 2017): https:// www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/wars-changing-character-and-varying-nature-a-closer-look-at-clausewitzs-trinity/. Instead of inserting Clausewitz’s On War in my Notes, I thought a good article which addresses war goals is a better idea and the Clausewitz quote is in this article.
Walter Isaacson, “Opinion: ‘How am I in this war?’: The untold story of Elon Musk’s support for Ukraine,” Washington Post (September 7, 2023): https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/09/07/elon-musk-starlink-ukraine-russia-invasion/
Mansur Mirovalev and Niko Vorobyov, “’Russia’s war goals haven’t changed: destroying Ukraine,’” Aljazeera (February 22, 2023): https:// www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2023/2/22/russias-war-in-ukraine-after-a-year-of-conflict-what-next
Sam Skove, “Navies face ‘dreadnought moment’ as Ukraine destroys more Russian warships, British admiral says,” Defense One (September 13, 2023): https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/09/navies-face-dreadnought-moment-ukraine-destroys-more-russian-warships-british-admiral-says/390271/