The Iran Nuclear Deal That Should Have Been: Reexamining a Trump Foreign Policy Decision with no Success and Possible Consequences to Come
American Eclectic posts articles twice a month, on the 1st and 15th. This is the second year of publication; previously published articles can be found on my site.
July 15, 2023
In 2015, Iran agreed to a nuclear deal with six countries (the United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and China) and the European Union. The deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) would have, at best, slowed down Iran from producing enriched uranium which is needed to make nuclear bombs. Donald Trump as a Presidential candidate in the 2016 election was critical of this deal and saw it as a bad agreement and pushed the position that he could do better in negotiations. At the time of the agreement, Iran was farther away from enriching uranium, now they are closer, which has the potential to cause increased Middle East tensions.
The primary aspects of the agreement required Iran to do two things: 1) reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium, and 2) reduce the number of its gas centrifuges (needed to enrich uranium—enriched uranium is needed to make nuclear bombs). Oddly, after Trump became President, once in 2017 and then again in 2018, his administration verified Iran was in compliance with the agreement and then he withdrew from the accord citing a campaign promise to do so.
Iran’s nuclear program began in the late 1960s, when a research reactor supplied by the United States became operational. At the time, Iran was an ally of the United States with the Shah in power. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 halted nuclear development and then progress started again but Israeli planes bombed a nuclear facility (Osirak) in 1981 that was under construction some ten miles south of Baghdad. Israel saw the strike as an act of self-defense and said the reactor was close to becoming operational. This reactor was bought from the French and was under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and despite assurances that the aim was to use nuclear energy peacefully, Israel doubted those claims. This background helps to put any current situation into a perspective where, although Trump while President liked to present himself as a champion of Israel, his decision to withdraw the United States from JCPOA may have done more harm than good for Israel and presents more problems than are already needed regarding the Middle East.
That Trump withdrew the United States from JCPOA citing legitimate concerns that his administration had about the agreement, however, that was probably more of a “cover” position: He wanted to undo anything associated with Barack Obama’s Presidency and the Iran nuclear deal was a crowning foreign policy achievement of the Obama Presidency. In May 2018, Trump ended United States involvement in JCPOA stating, “This was a horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made. It didn’t bring calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will.”
Sanctions, addressed in my last article, were shown to have a poor track record of getting countries affected to become more accommodating. In the case of the sanctions placed on Iran, however, they might have contributed to pushing Iran to agree to some limits on its nuclear program. The sanctions were imposed beginning in 2006 and in 2012 Iran experienced a deep recession followed by less severe ones in 2013 and 2015. In addition, Iranian household budgets fell steadily from 2007 until 2015. Technically, Iran has experienced sanctions since 1979 but they have changed over the years. 1979 was the year of the Iran Revolution that toppled the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, known as the Shah and brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power.
With the withdrawal from JCPOA in 2018 sanctions imposed on Iran became known as the “maximum pressure” campaign. There is no doubt that the campaign was devastating to the Iranian economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example said Iran’s reserves fell from $70 billion in 2017 to $4 billion in 2020. An Atlantic Council report in 2020, however, on Trump’s maximum pressure campaign stated:
Americans should not be surprised that we almost went to war with Iran in January. Military escalation is the logical outcome of a US “maximum pressure” campaign that, by steadily squeezing the Iranian economy and providing no viable diplomatic off-ramps, incentivizes Tehran to fight back. In the process, we continually impose upon ourselves the dilemma of responding to Iranian aggression with restraint, potentially encouraging bolder acts of defiance, or upping the ante in order to “restore deterrence.”
This cycle of escalation is counterproductive to US President Donald Trump’s own National Defense Strategy (NDS) of prioritizing great power competition with China and Russia—one of the few Trump visions for America that democrats and republicans generally support. If the United States is serious when it asserts that “Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities,” then the Trump administration must reevaluate its policy of maximum pressure toward Iran.
Trump’s Iran sanctions demanded the sky and moon above from Iran. The twelve demands included Iran ending its support of terrorism, ending its support of Syria in its civil war, ending its nuclear program, as well as an end to its missile development program. The goals may be seen as worthy; however, this is international affairs where sides in conflict never get everything they want. It may be frustrating to citizens following American foreign policy that we do not get everything any Presidential administration wants, but administrations need to step back and address what is feasible. Trump wanted Mexico to pay for his wall, you can see how far that got. Being tough can look good from a PR point of view but it is not always the best way to conduct foreign policy. A military attaché I discussed sanctions with felt that the real audience of sanctions was domestic—a way of making an administration look like it was doing something for the “folks back home.” I am not always sure I completely agree with him, but in this situation I do. Trump did something that he felt played well with an American domestic audience—at least his supporters, but his administration’s actions were harmful to American and global interests in international affairs.
JCPOA had its limitations, what else is new. It is almost impossible to find any international agreement that satisfies everyone in every way. Certainly, that the agreement did not address Iranian missile development can be pointed to as a weakness, but the broader goal of slowing an Iranian uranium enrichment program was a more important goal. Only recently, the Biden administration-imposed sanctions on individuals in China, Hong Kong, and Iran associated with the development of an Iranian ballistic missile program. If reports are true, that Iran has developed a hypersonic ballistic missile then that adds to the potential for tensions increasing in the Middle East. If JOPOA were in force this missile development would not necessarily have been affected but taken together, an advancement in hypersonic missile development with a uranium enrichment program that might allow Iran to produce 4-6 nuclear bombs at some point in the near future simply increases the potential for problems.
In the case of Iran’s missile development, an Iranian state media spokesman stated:
The precision-guided Fattah hypersonic missile has a range of 1,400 km and it is capable of penetrating all defense shields. …It can bypass the most advanced anti-ballistic missile systems of the United States and the Zionist regime, including Israel's Iron Dome.
As Trump was leaving office he pushed for more sanctions on Iran in January 2021. These final Trump sanctions were aimed at Iran’s nuclear, military, and missile technology programs. The overall purpose of Trump’s sanctions was to force Iran back to the bargaining table and, in the end that did not happen. The strong man image might play well with some constituency within the United States, unfortunately playing to a domestic audience is not always in the best interest of the country in dealing with international affairs.
In May, the IAEA reported Iranian uranium enrichment at 83.7 per cent. Usually, 90 per cent is the figure used to classify enriched uranium as needed for nuclear bomb making. There seems to be some issues with Iran withholding surveillance footage from the IAEA since February 2021 which should show centrifuges, used to spin uranium gas which enriches the uranium. Withholding information is not a way to provide confidence that clandestine activity is not being undertaken.
In January 2021, General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, feared that Trump might decide to launch a war with Iran. A New Yorker piece that discussed this concerning situation added, “Trump had a circle of Iran hawks around him and was close with the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who was also urging the Administration to act against Iran after it was clear that Trump had lost the election.” Did Netanyahu see an opportunity to manipulate Trump? Can we assume that since Iran is closer now to uranium enrichment and its ballistic missile development program may be farther along than in January 2021, that Netanyahu might not try again to whisper in Trump’s ear if he is back in the White House? The New Yorker piece added:
In the months after the election, with Trump seemingly willing to do anything to stay in power, the subject of Iran was repeatedly raised in White House meetings with the President, and Milley repeatedly argued against a strike.
Interestingly, former Israeli security officials were critical of Netanyahu urging Trump to withdraw from JOPOA. This was in 2021, which gave them time to see that the maximum pressure campaign of Trump sanctions was not working. Can we assume that a repeat tour of Trump in the White House would consist of repeat mistakes regarding foreign policy conduct?
There is little indication that Trump has learned from their mistakes. Trump’s not addressing the reality of his decisions can be seen in his administration’s negotiations to end the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan. A State Department document titled “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America,” dated February 29, 2020, addressed a prisoner exchange. This exchange included 5,000 Taliban fighters for 1,000 prisoners held by the Taliban. The document states:
The United States is committed to start immediately to work with all relevant sides on a plan to expeditiously release combat and political prisoners as a confidence building measure with the coordination and approval of all relevant sides. Up to five thousand (5,000) prisoners of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and up to one thousand (1,000) prisoners of the other side will be released by March 10, 2020.
The Biden administration might be faulted for being surprised by the swiftness of the collapse of the U.S.-backed Afghanistan government, which led to the chaos that led to the rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan and the death of 13 American troops at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul. The Afghan Peace Dialogue Project at Queen’s University in Belfast, Northern Ireland, concluded that most of the Taliban who were released by Trump returned to fight and were part of that final push to get Americans out of Afghanistan. In September 2021, Trump said it was not him but an “inept Afghanistan government” that freed the 5,000 Taliban, which is not true. Trump’s then Secretary of States, Mike Pompeo, addressed the prisoner exchange as paving the way to reach an agreement to end American involvement in Afghanistan. Trump’s refusal to address his own administration’s involvement and to quickly blame others provides some insight as to how he would look at other foreign policy issues. How would he look at Iran now considering where they are with their enriched uranium program and ballistic missile development compared with 2015, only raises serious concerns about how he would handle Iran if he were back as President. One observer of Trump and his personality wrote, “Mr. Trump does not learn from his mistakes but rather comes to see them as virtues.” Trump back in the White House has disaster written all over it for American foreign policy.
The Biden administration has made overtures to get the nuclear deal restarted but little progress has been made. A respectable online news site about Middle East affairs, Middle East Eye, in June reported that the United States and Iran were close to a nuclear agreement, however, both countries rejected that report. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader stated, “There is nothing wrong with the agreement [with the West], but the infrastructure of our nuclear industry should not be touched.” An American official stated, “Any reports of an interim deal are false.” No doubt a second Biden term will continue to address the issue since it is too important to just let it slide by, but it is anyone’s guess how much progress can be made.
Notes
“A History of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Iran Watch, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (August 9, 2016): https:// www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/history-irans-nuclear-program#9
Susan Glasser, “You’re Going to Have a Fucking War:” Mark Milley’s Fight to Stop Trump from Striking Iran,” New Yorker (July 15, 2021): https:// www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-bidens-washington/youre-gonna-have-a-fucking-war-mark-milleys-fight-to-stop-trump-from-striking-iran
Parisa Hafezi, “Iran presents its first hypersonic ballistic missile, state media reports,” Reuters (June 6, 2023): https:// www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-unveils-its-first-hypersonic-ballistic-missile-state-media-reports-2023-06-06/
Stephanie Liechtenstein, “International Atomic Agency Reports seen by AP say Iran resolves two inquiries by inspectors,” Washington Post (May 31, 2023): https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/31/iran-nuclear-program-iaea-uranium-enrichment/8add8bc6-ffc4-11ed-9eb0-6c94dcb16fcf_story.html
Jordan Liles, “Did the Trump Admin Agree to Free 5,000 Taliban Prisoners?” Snopes (December 12, 2022): https:// www.snopes.com/fact-check/trump-5000-taliban-prisoners/
MEE Correspondent in Iran, “Iran and US near interim deal on nuclear enrichment and oil exports,” MEE Middle East Eye (June 8, 2023): https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-us-nuclear-near-interim-deal-enrichment-oil-exports. I get the feeling this article was probably correct as a “feeler” and it floated the notion of a nuclear deal to see “how it played” with important constituents within both the United States and Iran.
MEE Staff, “Iran's Khamenei says 'nothing wrong' with a nuclear deal with the West,” MEE Middle East Eye (June 11, 2023): https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-khamenei-nuclear-nothing-wrong-deal-west
Lynn O’Donnell, “Defying Peace Deal, Freed Taliban Return to Battlefield,” FP (September 3, 2020): https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/03/defying-peace-deal-freed-taliban-prisoners-return-battlefield-afghanistan/
Amir Paivar, “Nuclear deal: is Iran’s economy better off now?” BBC (May 4, 2018): https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43975498
Shira Rubin, “Israel opposed nuclear deal, but former Israeli officials say U.S. pullout was a mistake,” Washington Post (December 9, 2021): https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-iran-nuclear-deal-sanctions/2021/12/08/ece28168-56c0-11ec-8396-5552bef55c3c_story.html
David Walsh, “The ‘maximum pressure’ campaign undermines Trump’s national security strategy,” Atlantic Council (February 12, 2020): https:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-maximum-pressure-campaign-undermines-trumps-national-security-strategy/
Joe Walsh, “Trump Denies Releasing 5,000 Prisoners-But His administration Negotiated for their Release,” Forbes (September 14, 2021): https:// www.forbes.com/sites/joewalsh/2021/09/13/trump-denies-releasing-5000-taliban-prisoners---but-his-administration-negotiated-for-their-release/?sh=4bafc49e419b
Michael Wolff, “the Chaos Inside Donald Trump’s Mind,” New York Times (November 15, 2022): https:// www.nytimes.com/2022/11/15/opinion/donald-trump-campaign-chaos.html