Russian Sanctions will Affect Countries for Years to Come. Understanding this Issue Matters. Unfortunately, it Does Not Receive the Attention it Deserves

July 1, 2023

I see this essay as a lead-in to my next essay which will address Donald Trump’s Presidency when he attempted to induce Iran to give more of what critics of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) wanted in the way of concessions to prevent them from developing a nuclear capability.  Somehow Trump just believed if the United States withdrew from JCPOA in which Iran in 2015 agreed to limitations on its nuclear program, more sanctions would magically get Iran to agree to more limitations on its nuclear program: That was not the case, and we are now closer to a nuclear-capable Iran which can create serious problems for the Middle East and that can spill over to affect us all.

It is a good idea to recall Trump and his foolish foreign policy ideas since he has talked of ending the Ukraine War within 24-hours after he is back in the White House, assuming he ends up back in the White House.  Trump always seems to like TV show endings where everything dovetails neatly to a convenient wrap-up.  It is unfortunate such public relations talk about foreign policy resonates with too many Americans.

Sanctions are a tricky tool of foreign policy, sort of a halfway measure between diplomacy and threatening or conducting military action and I do not see the issue addressed well on TV news.  That is a shame, since sanctions will, no doubt, be a feature of international affairs well into the foreseeable future.  As a result, it might be a good idea for the public to have a better understanding of sanctions, rather than just a vague, superficial awareness of them.  Since the 1990s, the United States, the European Union, and other developed countries together have imposed sanctions on some country somewhere more than 500 times.  Admittedly, it is a good idea to have something that provides a step before threatening military action, but the frustrating feature of sanctions is wondering when and how they work.  In 1966, for example, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on the white supremacy government of Ian Smith’s in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).  Years later it is still difficult to determine whether those sanctions had the desired goal of ending Smith’s government since he stayed in office until 1979.  During much of Smith’s rule, there was the Bush War which overlapped with the sanctions, that war began in 1964 and lasted until 1979.  Victory was never really achieved by any of the parties in this war and a settlement was reached in 1978 that led to the end of Smith’s rule the next year.  In the case of Haiti, a military coup overthrew the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991.  The George H.W. Bush Administration was willing to find a compromise position with the military junta, they did, however, work with the Organization of American States (OAS) to impose a trade embargo but the election of Bill Clinton as President in 1992 increased the pressure to do something with more clout.  Clinton, under pressure from Haitian Americans as well as the Congressional Black Caucus imposed sanctions.  The sanctions were seen as ineffective, and a military force was deployed to end the military junta and restore Aristide to office.  Associated with Clinton administration actions, the United Nations Security Council imposed a naval blockade on Haiti.  With a military force of 25,000 sitting offshore from Haiti, former President Jimmy Carter led a delegation to Haiti to reach a settlement.  No doubt Carter let it be known failure to achieve an agreement would lead to an invasion.  A month after Carter’s trip, Aristide returned to office. Studies show that the sanctions imposed on Haiti had a devastating effect, yet, by themselves, the miliary junta did not end its control of the country.

CNBC posted two articles about two weeks apart in February 2023 on the issue of sanctions on Russia associated with their invasion of Ukraine in 2022, although sanctions have been imposed on that country beginning in 2014 when they occupied Crimea (which is part of Ukraine).  One article was titled, “Sanctions on Russian crude oil have ‘failed completely,’ oil analyst says,” the second article was titled, “Sanctions on Russian Oil are having the ‘intended effect,’ IEA says.” The titles of the two articles give a sense of what each author believed. Which article was accurate in its assessment of the sanctions imposed on Russia?  The answer is both were correct, well somewhat.  Notice that if a short TV news segment tried to address these two articles and the reporter said, “This issue cannot adequately be covered in my few minutes, go read a few books and 15 to 20 articles,” how well that would go over.  There is nothing wrong with making a public aware that many issues are much too complex to be covered well in a short, often superficial, TV news segment, but, unfortunately, when did you ever hear that said on a TV news (or opinion) show. One former colleague who taught media studies referred to the problem of TV news as “Headline Only News.”

Can TV news do an adequate job explaining sanctions and can a public that hears and watches these short segments on a news show walk away with an appreciation for the issue?  I think not.  The two CNBC articles approached the issue of sanctions on Russian oil from different points of view.  In the case of the article in which an oil analyst said sanctions had “failed completely,” he looked at Russian oil still flowing and that it will find its way to other markets such as China and India.  The analyst stated, “China and India have benefited quite a big deal last year from heavily discounted Russian crude [oil] prices and the same’s going to happen to Russian refined [oil] products.” In the case of the article that saw sanctions working, or more correctly beginning to work, the head of the oil trade and markets division of the International Energy Agency (IAE) did address Russian oil flowing to China and India, but saw the issue as less the flow of oil and more a reduction in revenue stating, “As an example in January, export revenues for Russia have been about $13 billion, that is down 36% from a year in the past…so in that sense we are able to say that [sanctions are] having its supposed impact.”  Is the issue that Russia found new markets for its oil as new customers see an opportunity to buy oil cheaper than otherwise would be the case or is the issue to impact the revenue Russia receives from its oil. It should be noted that Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, has benefited from cheaper Russian oil. Turkey doubled the import of Russian oil through 2022 and has continued to import high volumes through 2023. We can say that sanctions are aimed at trying to disrupt the flow of Russian oil and that sanctions are also aimed at trying to reduce the revenue they receive from their oil.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, but the European Union ban on the import of Russian oil did not begin until February 2023.  That ban covered two-thirds of Russian imported oil.  The ban, however, did not apply to Russian oil imported through pipelines.  The Druzhba pipeline began in 1964 and has supplied oil to central and eastern European countries.  The aim is that by the end of 2023, Germany, Poland, and Austria will have weened themselves off the flow of this source of oil, while other European countries might be able to end their dependence on this oil source, but it will take several more years.  In looking at the Druzhba pipeline (also known as the Friendship pipeline) in terms of the two CNBC articles, again both made legitimate points, Russian oil continues to flow and revenue from oil is down and, hopefully, headed farther down.  The Druzhba pipeline runs some 2,500 miles from the Tatarstan region of Russia located near Kazakhstan.  Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria are still very dependent on Russian pipeline oil and discussions to help these countries find alternative sources of oil sound more like aspirations than feasible goals.  There was a stoppage of the flow of Russian pipeline oil in August 2022 that lasted a bit more than a week caused by a transit fee payment issue.  In the case of the Czech Republic about half of its oil consumption comes from Russia.  In October 2022, eight months after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, Hungary and Serbia reached an agreement to build a pipeline which would supply Serbia with Russian oil.  A Hungarian government official stated, “The new oil pipeline would enable Serbia to be supplied with cheaper Urals crude oil, connecting to the Friendship oil pipeline.” The Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, has been quite critical of sanctions imposed on Russia. Slovakia says it would take until 2025 to cut its dependence on Russia pipeline oil.

In other words, if the only way to evaluate the sanctions as being effective against Russia is by basing that assessment on completely cutting the flow of Russian oil, then the sanctions are seen as ineffective.  If we use 2021 as a base year, however, then that year, the European Union imported almost $75 billion of both crude and refined Russian oil.  Of the 2.2 million barrels of oil a day imported, 700,000 barrels came via pipelines, representing about 32 per cent of the total Russian oil imported.  The 1.5 million barrels of Russian oil that came by seaborne shipments is what will be affected.  As this ban on seaborne Russian oil continues to take effect, that oil changed direction and headed to Asia.  Obviously, changing circumstances call for new sanctions to try to adversely affect Russian oil flows.  This can sound much like a game of whack-a-mole.

The wrong way to look at sanctions is in terms of an immediate cause-and-effect, which is not the case.  Sanctions on Russia have been imposed in bits and pieces—tinkering is a better way to look at this process.  A military attaché associated with an American embassy I discussed sanctions with me, pointed out that with more than 200 countries on the planet, only fifty or so are even involved in applying sanctions on Russia for their invasion of Ukraine.  Furthermore, following the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, sanctions were imposed and, obviously, those sanctions had little effect on giving second thoughts to Vladimir Putin to not invade Ukraine last year.  Crimea became part of Ukraine in 1954.  Ukraine leaders, as well as public opinion polls support the position of taking Crimea back, although that is a hard hill to climb since it is questionable whether Ukraine has the military capability to do just that.

Tinkering is a good description for the evolving sanctions process.  Tinkering describes a process of add-ons where different Russian individuals, organizations, businesses, and business projects are added to an ever-expanding list of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States, Canada, well as other countries.  The process of adding new sanctions is not always an easy one.  For example, the European Union pushed to add sanctions in June 2022, a sixth set of sanctions, but Viktor Orban wanted the head of the Russian Orthodox Church removed from the list of Russian individuals who had been placed on a sanctions list.  The church leader, (Kirill) is seen as a vocal supporter of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Frustration over not seeing immediate results from sanctions does not mean giving up, since that seems foolish and would show a lack of support for Ukraine.  In other words, because we may not see the results of sanctions now, we simply cannot change direction and go back to pre-sanctions and see Europe resume a dependence on Russia oil.  The European Union, the United States, as well as other countries supporting sanctions are on a merry-go-round that requires more tinkering, more frustration leading to more sanctions, with no immediate end in sight.  Even if the Ukraine War ends soon, sanctions appear to be there for years after the war ends.

John Zada, a television news writer, wrote, “News is often reported in a vacuum devoid of its fuller context.” Zada added:

One of the most basic, and well-known, levels of news filtering is the tendency to report on negative news.  Over time this has the impact of creating the impression that the world is constantly on the cusp of collapse.  So much of what happens that is positive or neutral in value, the vast majority of events, slip through the dragnet and is thus omitted from the news.

The issue of sanctions, an issue that is important to international affairs, easily falls into that description. As can be understood from what I addressed here, sanctions begin with an assumption of failure and through a process of tinkering hopefully something good happens. Studies point to a low success rate for sanctions, often around 20 per cent of the time. The format of TV news does not help the public develop an appreciation for just how incredibly hard this process is and that contributes to a public that wants to turn its back on understanding a key feature of the conduct of foreign policy. Furthermore, while the sanctions regarding Rhodesia and Haiti could be seen as fading into the background after Smith’s government ended and after the military junto ended its rule, the sanctions against Russia and the long slow process of affecting the way energy sources flow, such as oil and natural gas, has the potential to be a part of global relations for decades to come. It is unfortunate that TV news will cover this issue in its usual superficial way and will leave viewers with little understanding of the consequences of Russian sanctions that will affect many countries, years after the Ukraine War begins to fade into history.

I can expect that as Trump marches toward a Republican nomination to run for President, yet again, he will feel the need to loosely throw around the threat of sanctions as a foreign policy tool and he will proclaim that somehow, he and only he will be able to use sanctions to get something from some country somewhere. Trump’s appeal to many is often his proclamations that he has solutions to issues that need to be addressed. Unfortunately, whatever nonsense he says will be easily believed since TV news will do a poor job taking the time to explain the issue and that will be dangerous to the conduct of American foreign policy.

Notes

Sumathi Bala, “Sanctions on Russian crude oil have ‘failed completely,’ oil analyst says,” CNBC (February 3, 2023): https:// www.cnbc.com/2023/02/03/sanctions-on-russian-crude-oil-have-failed-completely-oil-analyst-says.html

John Parachini, “A Test of How Effective Sanctions Are,” RAND Corporation (February 24, 2022): https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/02/a-test-of-how-effective-sanctions-are.html

Dursun Peksen, “When Do Economic Sanctions Work Best?” CNAS (June 10, 2019): https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/when-do-economic-sanctions-work-best#:~:text=Given%20the%20relatively%20low%20success%20rate%20of%20sanctions%2C,achieving%20major%20policy%20objectives%20than%20modest%20ones.%20

Elliot Smooth, “Sanctions on Russian oil are having the ‘intended effect,’ IEA says,” CNBC (February 16, 2023): https:// www.cnbc.com/2023/02/16/sanctions-on-russian-oil-are-having-the-intended-effect-iea-says.html

Adam Taylor, “13 Times that Economic Sanctions Really Worked,” Washington Post (April 28, 2014): https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/28/13-times-that-economic-sanctions-really-worked/

John Zada, Veils of Distortion: How the News Media Warps our Minds (Canada, Terra Incognita Press, 2021)