Russian Depopulation: The Effect of the Ukraine War and Likely Problems to Come
American Eclectic posts articles twice a month, on the 1st and 15th. This is the fourth year of publication; previously published articles can be found on my site.
November 1, 2025
Murray Feshbach was a renowned economist who frequently addressed issues related to the former Soviet Union, particularly those concerning demographics. This occurred during the Cold War era, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Feshbach worked with the U.S. Census Bureau for 25 years, specifically with the Foreign Demographics Analysis Division, and then accepted a position at George Washington University’s Center for Population Research in 1981. In one area, life expectancy, a journalist wrote of Feshbach and how he looked at the Soviet Union as it was entering the 1980s:
The mortality rate...is as symptomatic to a demographer as the prime rate is to an economist. In the USSR, death rates have been rising steadily, from 6.9 deaths per 1,000 persons in 1964 to 10.3 in 1980. “This is unprecedented in a developed nation,” Feshbach explained. The expected longevity of newborn males has declined during the past fourteen years from sixty-six years to sixty-two, while that of females, after a period of gradual extension, has leveled off at seventy-four. The disparity between male and female life expectancy at birth in the Soviet Union—some 11.5 years—is exceeded in no other country.
Feshbach noted that population issues were a concern to the Soviets in the 1970s and were becoming more acute in the 1980s. Ethnic Russians were having fewer babies, and Muslims within the Soviet Union were having more. Feshbach pointed out that Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982, stated at the 25th Party Congress in 1976 that this was a problem the Soviet Union had to face, emphasizing the need for an “effective demographic policy.”
In a 1986 report, Feshbach noted that what he termed a “second postwar demographic curve” had emerged in the 1970s. By the 1980s, the Soviet Union was experiencing a decline in life expectancy, an increase in child mortality, a rise in alcoholism, and a general deterioration in public health. Feshbach concluded:
It takes time for researchers to understand the causes and consequences that spell problems for policymakers.
So, he concluded that the 1970s opened the Soviet Union to admitting that there were problems that needed to be addressed, and Brezhnev’s remarks at the party congress in 1976 indicated that.
What emerged within the Soviet Union during the 1970s is in contrast to what is developing within Russia at present. One recent report stated:
Demography in Russia no longer exists. Or rather, it no longer appears in the reports on the socio-economic situation that the country’s Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat) publishes each month. The May report contains no figures relating to the Russian population: no births, no deaths, no marriages or divorces. In the previous edition, the demographic data were still included but no longer broken down by region. Now, even the overall numbers have been withheld.
“We have been completely deprived of information about the population of our country,” analysts from the MMI think tank told The Moscow Times, an independent English-language and Russian-language online newspaper.
What Feshbach called the second demographic curve might now be referred to as the third demographic curve, as Russia begins to experience —and obviously tries to conceal —problems related to population. The Ukraine War, in some ways, began to highlight population issues as people associated with the war began to flee.
I spent five months in 2023 in Tbilisi, the capital of the Republic of Georgia, one of the former 15 republics of the Soviet Union. I interviewed Russians who were part of this exodus. Russian tourists had always come to Georgia, particularly to enjoy the capital city and its fine wines, but 2023 began to show Georgians that the Russians coming were different than tourists; they were escaping being drafted to fight in Ukraine. One Russian I spoke with told me that he had been playing basketball with friends in Moscow and suddenly a bus pulled up, state police jumped out, threw all of them to the ground, and checked their IDs. He knew there was a push to force Russians into the military. He told me that he had a friend who was “drafted” and that he received little in the way of military training and was shipped off to fight in Ukraine. He was trying to find out if he was alive and well.
I interviewed several cab drivers from Tbilisi who drove to the Russian border, waiting for Russians to cross, and then brought them back to the city. After the approximately one-hour drive to the capital, they would get out and walk off, and these drivers were unsure of their destination in the town. Estimates of the number of Russians in Tbilisi and throughout Georgia are challenging to obtain. Still, figures ranging from 300,000 to 700,000 were reported (the high-end figure may have been an exaggeration).
I was told that Vladimir Putin sent troops from Moscow to the border with Georgia to try to put a halt to this emigration. Many of these new border guards were willing to take bribes to allow people to cross the border. Stories of families driving to the border and leaving their cars on the Russian side and walking across the border, I heard more than once.
Population issues associated with the Ukraine War were not only related to Russians fleeing to avoid being drafted or escaping what they felt were increasingly repressive Russian policies; there is also the issue of Russian deaths associated with the war. Guesstimates are the best that can be said about Russian war casualties; figures of over one million dead and wounded are used to illustrate the degree of devastation the Russians are suffering, which, no doubt, pleases Ukrainians who are suffering their own high numbers.
The Russian emigration to Georgia is only part of a larger exodus (estimated at approaching one million); together with the increasing number of deaths and casualties resulting from the Ukraine War, it does not bode well for Russia’s future, given projected population decline. A well-known Russian scientist, Dmitri Mendeleev, in 1906, predicted that by the end of the 20th Century, there would be 600 million Russians. Today, Russia's population stands at approximately 144 million, with one study projecting a decline of 15.4 million by 2046 and a United Nations report predicting a population decline of 25-50 percent by 2100.
The impact of the Ukraine War is evident in the disparity between male and female numbers. Globally, there are 102 men for every 100 women; however, in Russia, the ratio is 87 men for every 100 women. With Putin continuing this war for several more years, the hope of trying to gain a few more yards of ground on the battlefield or hoping to gain an edge in negotiations to end the war will seem insignificant next to the impact the war can have on the Russian population and the country’s capability to remain a stable and viable economy. Population decline can reduce the workforce size, decrease demand for consumer goods, and slow economic growth. One study estimated that for every 1 percent decline in population, economic growth would decline by 0.5 percent. With the type of decline Russia is projected to experience over the next several decades, the impact on economic growth can be devastating.
Predictions about a severe decline in the Russian population are not a recent development. Murray Feshbach, back in 2004, predicted that the Russian population would fall to 101 million or even 77 million by 2050. At the time, Feshbach noted that Russia and Ukraine had something in common: Both countries had the fastest-growing cases of HIV/AIDS. Projections were that 5-14 million Russians were going to be infected and that the annual death rate was estimated to be between 250,000 and 600,000. An assessment of Russian health in those years, some 15 years or so after the fall of the Soviet Union, was not rosy:
In Russia, deaths far outnumber births. Meanwhile, only a third of Russian babies are born healthy and last year's child health census showed that some 50 to 60 percent of all Russian children suffer from a chronic illness. Current mortality rates reflect the very high share of deaths between ages 20 and 49, potentially the most productive population segment. Such a population decline has a devastating impact on the labor force, military recruitment, and family formation.
One study on why Russia went to war against Ukraine in 2022 was what they called the “demographic factor.” Russia saw the need to capture population and abduct children as a way to try to solve its declining population problem partially. Obviously, if that was a reason to invade, it simply exacerbated the population decrease problem as battlefield deaths and casualty numbers continue to escalate.
Besides health and child mortality, alcoholism has always been referred to as a major culprit of the Russian population problems. Liver disease deaths are often associated with alcoholism, which is approximately 22 deaths per 100,000, but there are countries with higher death rates. Mongolia, for example, has 75 deaths per 100,000. However, compared to those of Canada, which has 6 deaths per 100,000, and the United States, which has 9 deaths per 100,000, Russian statistics are high. Lancet, an internationally respected medical journal, however, noted that Russia has been successfully addressing alcoholism. The journal noted where Russia was in the years soon after the end of the Soviet Union:
In the early 1990s, data showed that one in two men of working age would die prematurely because of alcohol, with life expectancy in men reaching an absolute low of 57 years in 1994. Total adult per capita alcohol consumption increased between 1991 and 2003: this rise coincided with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, in 1991, and a total liberalisation of alcohol prices. In 1995, the government slowly introduced alcohol production control measures, including Federal Law number 171, and restrictions on licensing and advertising, with limited success.
By 2018, life expectancies had reached historic highs, with 68 years for men and 78 for women. Taxes and restrictions on liquor sales were effective, although the journal noted there was still a long way to go. While alcoholism may now play less of a role in reducing Russia’s population, there are still many factors that matter.
Despite this limited success, Putin’s decision to postpone the All-Russian Population Census until 2029 suggests he is aware of the problems he faces. No doubt his cancellation is a reflection of an issue he has grappled with since taking power in his own right in 2000. In an address at the time, he stated:
We, the citizens of Russia, are fewer and fewer with each passing year. For several years now, the population has dropped by an average of 750,000 people every year. And if we are to believe predictions the predictions, and these predictions are based on real work, the work of people who understand this and have their entire lives to this, in 15 years, the number of Russian citizens may drop by 22 million.
I would ask you to think this figure over: it is one seventh of the country’s population. If the current tendency continues, the survival of the nation will be threatened. We really do face the threat of becoming an enfeebled nation. Today the demographic situation is one of the most alarming that the country faces.
During the first six months of 2024, 599,600 children were born in Russia, 16,000 fewer than in the same period a year earlier. The head of the State Duma Committee for Family Protection said there was a need for a "special demographic operation." Putin’s spokesman called the birth rate issue “catastrophic.” Ironically, while Putin has made increasing the birth rate a significant problem that needs to be addressed, the irony of his invasion of Ukraine may be that it has contributed to the low birth rate. One Russian analyst stated:
With the war continuing in its third year, and now directly impacting Russian territory, money is not the only factor. With the security situation in border regions uncertain, families are delaying decisions on having children.
One development that might get worse associated with Russia’s need for troops to fight in the Ukraine War is the essentially shanghaiing of foreigners to fight. A recruitment center opened in Moscow for foreigners to join the military. The biggest group of migrant workers in Russia comes from the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Leaflets were handed out that read:
Sign up with the Russian armed forces, go fight in Ukraine and earn a simplified path to citizenship, as well as a monthly salary of almost $3,300.
In 2021, for example, more than 4.5 million Uzbeks were working in Russia. The Uzbekistan embassy has warned Uzbeks about joining the Russian military to fight in Ukraine. This recruitment center in Moscow is also the place where migrant workers undergo medical tests and obtain work permits. As one scholar on Central Asian migration stated, “[It now houses the] Ministry of Defense recruiters who will offer foreign citizens expedited citizenship in exchange for joining the Russian army.”
The concern that Central Asian embassies in Russia worry about is Russia trying to recruit or coerce their citizens into military service, which started soon after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Reports circulated by September, only seven months after the war began, that Russia was seeking foreign recruits. Exactly how many Central Asians are fighting in Ukraine is not entirely clear. One source reported that 30,000 Central Asians have received Russian citizenship, assuming approximately one-third are in Ukraine, that would translate to around 10,000 Central Asians in the Russian military fighting in Ukraine. Of this number, more than 2,000 are Uzbek citizens.
A recent report stated:
Russia continues to recruit Central Asian nationals to fill the ranks of its depleting forces in Ukraine. Russia hosts millions of migrant workers from the former Soviet region.
Survivors, the relatives of the recruits, and rights activists say Russian authorities use various methods -- from offering enticements to torture and threats -- to enlist migrants and convicts from Central Asia.
One has to wonder if Russian war planners, anticipating that a quick victory would not occur, were concerned that a prolonged war could ensue, and that recruiting enough Russians to fight would become a problem.
This is a war that seems to have no light at the end of the tunnel about when or how it will end. If the Russian population problems have become more apparent due to the war, will this begin to dictate how Russia conducts its military strategy? We can anticipate that after the war, there will be a review and likely reforms to the Russian military, but what about the next year or even two, if this war persists?
One report assessing the Russian military and strategy stated:
The Ukraine war has demonstrated to Russia the superiority of Western technology, even though Ukrainian forces are fighting with older Western equipment. Russia is aware of the comparative strengths of Western capabilities, which could influence Russian leaders to take the A New, New Look pathway. Experts cautioned that it will be difficult for Russia to make qualitative improvements across the armed forces: Russia has historically struggled to maintain technical skills within the ranks of the military. Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, technical experts have left Russia en masse, and the existing workforce of technologists in the Russian military-industrial complex is continuing to age. As sanctions continue, moreover, the country’s ability to import needed components, such as microchips, will serve as a constraint.
A war of attrition, which is where the war currently stands, may only continue to highlight Russia’s population problems. There were 195,000 Russian births in January and February this year, which was 3 percent lower than the same period the previous year. February alone saw 90,500 births, 7,400 fewer than in February 2024. Comparisons for low birth rates are taking Russian demographers back to the early 1800s. Admittedly, babies will not be recruited to fight, but reflecting on the military manpower problems Russia is facing now is helpful.
When I was in Tbilisi, there were reports (later denied by the American embassy) that the United States wanted Georgia to open a second front in the Ukraine War. Some Georgian politicians claimed that the United States sought a war of attrition and that a second front would exacerbate Russia’s situation, not only in the war itself, but also more broadly within the Russian economy and political system.
Ukraine is suffering as this war continues, but the best that can be said regarding Russia, if in the end it gets to keep some territory in Ukraine, is that they had a Pyrrhic victory. Ukraine must have the option to join both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
NOTES
“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia (July 8, 2000): https://en.kremlin.eu/events/president/transcripts/21480
Azattyq Asia, “Thousands of Central Asians Enlisted to Fight in Russia’s War in Ukraine, ‘Through Coercion, Enticements,” RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty (August 20, 2025): https://www.rferl.org/amp/russia-ukraine-invasion-central-asia-migrants-convicts-recruit/33507394.html
Murray Feshbach, “The Soviet Population Debate: Actors and Issues,” N-2472-AF, RAND Corporation (December 1986): https:// www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/N2472.pdf
Michelle Grise, Mark Covad, Anna M. Dowd, John Kennedy, Marta Kepe, Clara de Lataillade, Krystyna Marcinek, David Woodworth, “Will Russia Reconstitute Its Military After the Ukraine Conflict?” RAND (March 27, 2025): https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA2713-2.html
Abigail Gutkovich, “From Superpower to Shrinking Nation: Is Russia Doomed to Decline?” The Science Survey (May 12, 2025): https://thesciencesurvey.com/news/2025/05/12/from-superpower-to-shrinking-nation-is-russia-doomed-to-decline/
Sarah Lee (an AI-generated article or author?), “The Impact of Population Decline,” NumberAnalytics (May 25, 2025): https://www.numberanalytics.com/blog/impact-of-population-decline. I need to look into this type of article. I use it here, but I need to understand better what an AI-generated something, anything, means exactly. Elsewhere, I have seen the issue of population decline related to economic growth, but referring to this particular article will force me to look into this type of citation.
Cullen Murphy, “Watching the Russians,” The Atlantic Monthly (February 1983): https:// cdn.theatlantic.com/media/archives/1983/02/251-2/132613737.pdf
Tamsin Paternoster, “Kremlin distressed as Russia’s ‘catastrophic’ birth rate drops to its lowest in quarter century,” EuroNews (October 9, 2024): https://www.euronews.com/2024/09/10/russias-birth-rate-drops-to-its-lowest-in-a-quarter-century-data-shows
Catherine Putz, “Are Central Asians Being Conscripted by Russia to Fight in Ukraine?” The Diplomat (October 4, 2024): https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/are-central-asians-being-conscripted-by-russia-to-fight-in-ukraine/
Catherine Putz, “As Russia Mobilizes, Central Asian Embassies Warn Citizens Against Joining a Foreign War,” The Diplomat (September 22, 2022): https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/as-russia-mobilizes-kyrgyz-and-uzbek-embassies-warn-citizens-against-joining-a-foreign-war/
“Rights watchdog documents forced mobilization of Central Asian labor migrants in Russian military,” eurasianet (May 19, 2025): https://eurasianet.org/rights-watchdog-documents-forced-mobilization-of-central-asian-labor-migrants-in-russian-military
“Russia’s alcohol policy: A continuing success story,” Lancet (October 5, 2019): https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2819%2932265-2/fulltext
“Scholars Predict Serious Population Decline in Russia,” Wilson Center (January 29, 2004): https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/scholar-predicts-serious-population-decline-russia#:~:text=Such%20a%20population%20decline%20has,factoring%20in%20the%20AIDS%20epidemic.
Bruno Tertrais, “Tragedy After Disaster: War in Ukraine and Demography,” Institut Montaigne (February 24, 2025): https:// www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions/tragedy-after-catastrophe-demographic-impact-war-russia-and-ukraine
Monica Duffey Toft, “Russia’s Demographic Vanishing Act: A Warning From History,” Russia Matters, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (August 6, 2025): https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/russias-demographic-vanishing-act-warning-history
World Health Rankings, Liver Disease: https://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/liver-disease/by-country/
Anna Zafesova, “Russian Census: When the Kremlin Hides Birth and Death Statistics,” WorldCrunch (July 13, 2025): https:// worldcrunch.com/focus/russia-ukraine-war/russian-census-when-the-kremlin-hides-birth-and-death-statistics/#:~:text=Officially%2C%20according%20to%20the%20most,to%20appear%20in%20the%20numbers.



Regarding the topic of the article, this historical context you provided is truly insightful. The numbers Feshbach quoted back then feel eerily predictive. I strongly agree, it's a very compelling analysys.