Putin's Political Use of Nuclear Threats and the Ukraine War: A Way to Look at a Longer History of Nuclear Threats and Ponder Whether Something Has Changed

December 15, 2022

Newt Gingrich, wrote a piece for the Washington Times in which he wrote, “The potential that Vladimir Putin could use nuclear weapons in Ukraine must be taken extremely seriously.  If things go wrong, we will look back upon this period as a parallel to early July 1914. At that time, European civilization seemed safe, prosperous, and on a path of improvement.”  I am not sure that Gingrich is correct, he creates the impression that if Putin feels he gets backed into a corner, he will use a nuclear device. I think the use of a nuclear device by Putin could happen differently.  What type of nuclear device and on what target inside of Ukraine are not addressed in his piece, just some vague reference that the nuclear option is on the table.  Walter Russell Mead made the point that Putin wants a return to the superpower status of the former Soviet Union so is using nuclear threats to achieve that:

Ever since taking power in Russia, Mr. Putin has been frustrated by his inability to parlay his country’s immense arsenal of nuclear weapons into real political power in the world. Nuclear weapons made the Soviet Union a superpower; Mr. Putin wants that stature back. Extracting significant concessions from the West by nuclear blackmail over Ukraine would be a major step in his goal of regaining the Soviet Union’s place in world affairs.

Any threat to use a nuclear device is scary and somehow the belief is that no leader anywhere should even raise the specter of nuclear use.  Since nuclear weapons started to be added to the arsenals of the United States and the then Soviet Union in the 1950s (I am thinking in terms of each side having enough weapons to consider them arsenals), both countries (now Russia instead of the Soviet Union) have struggled with how to apply nuclear weapons to actual credible use situations.

The early nuclear years (the late 1940s and early 1950s) had the atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb comes later.  The Soviets exploded an atomic bomb in 1949.  This explosion surprised the United States since it was assumed the Soviets were years away from such a feat.  As a result, scientists such as Edward Teller, pushed for a concerted American effort to produce the bigger, more powerful hydrogen bomb.  During these early years, there existed the General Advisory Council (GAC) to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the GAC was chaired by J. Robert Oppenheimer.  Discussions on this council centered around whether to push for the hydrogen bomb or whether to focus on accurate delivery systems and tactical nuclear weapons.  In other words, from those early years, we can see that within the United States there were discussions about how to use nuclear weapons of some sort in a military way to bolster political threats or to support diplomacy. With the GAC decision to push for the hydrogen bomb, Project Vista at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) focused on the topic of accurate nuclear delivery systems and tactical nuclear weapons.

When Dwight Eisenhower became President, elected in 1952, during his administration the focus on defense shifted to nuclear use with the “New Look” strategy, commonly known as Massive Retaliation, where the United States rationalized it could rely on nuclear weapons and reduce a reliance on conventional forces.  It might be a misnomer to assume that the image of Massive Retaliation somehow meant that the United States would let loose a whole bundle of nuclear weapons all at once.  In fact, in the first year of the Eisenhower Administration (1953), Strategic Air Command (SAC) was developing a variety of nuclear options, which became known as ALPHA and DELTA (large and soft targets) and BRAVO (military targets).

It should not be forgotten that when Eisenhower became President, the peace talks to end the Korean War had been dragging on since 1951 and frustration led to some discussion and maybe a threat to use nuclear weapons to bring the peace talks to a speedy end.  Eisenhower, in fact, had a meeting with General Douglas MacArthur in 1952, after then President Harry Truman removed him as commander of United Nations forces in Korea.  MacArthur raised the issue of using a nuclear weapon.  Sherman Adams, a close confident of Eisenhower recalled that MacArthur said, “the Communist would throw up their hands and the war would be over.”

Using a nuclear threat to bring the Korean War to an end did not die with this discussion between Eisenhower and MacArthur.  John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of States, had a meeting in May 1953 with Jawaharal Nehru, India’s Prime Minister, and, apparently, raised the issue of the United States intention to use a nuclear weapon to bring the war to an end.  The United States believed that Nehru passed this information along to the Chinese, who were for all instance purposes, running the show not the North Koreans.  Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River in October 1950, four months after North Korea invaded South Korea, so from then on it was the Chinese that mattered.  Did Nehru pass this possible/maybe/potentially real threat along to the Chinese?  Maybe.

What seems to matter is that this situation, the possible role played by a nuclear threat to end the Korean War, helped to fuel a belief that nuclear weapons had some role to play in the conduct of American foreign and military policy.  The belief, whatever happened in May 1953 leading to ending the Korean War in July of that year, only increased interest in the role nuclear weapons could potentially play as a tool in the conduct of foreign policy.  In looking at nuclear weapons and the ending of the Korean War, here was a situation that seemed real, the threat/fear of nuclear use could be used with diplomacy. Admittedly, other factors need to be taken into account which could have played a role in bringing negotiations to an end, such as the death of Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, in March. The Soviets supplied needed materials, particularly MIG-15 jet fighter planes. In fact, it is assumed (or maybe now known) that Soviet pilots flew those planes. Stalin’s death created uncertainty about continued Soviet support for the war.

During the John Kennedy Presidency, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to develop the No-Cities Doctrine, which addressed a possible use for nuclear weapons.  McNamara in a speech at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in June 1962 stated:

The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war be approached in much the same way more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past.

This attempt at defining a role, perhaps military, for nuclear weapons seemed to be short-lived.  McNamara wanted to distance himself from any discussion about the feasibility of nuclear weapons in “military operations.”  But the issue was not dead.  James Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense in June 1973 in the Richard Nixon Presidency and in January 1974, introduced what became known as the Targeting Doctrine.  The idea was that there were military, if not political uses for nuclear weapons.  By this time, the notion of Assured Destruction had taken hold, often known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD, the term, I think, originated with Donald Brennan, who was associated with the Hudson Institute).  Schlesinger emphasized that a role for nuclear weapons was not a replacement for MAD, more of a complement.  Schlesinger was removed as Secretary of Defense in November 1975 and, once again, while the use of nuclear weapons in some capacity besides MAD seemed to fade away it really did not.  President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) in July 1980 known as the “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy.”  At the time it was commonly known as the Countervailing Strategy.  Carter in addressing PD-59 wrote:

Our strategic nuclear forces must be able to deter nuclear attacks not only on our own country but also our forces overseas, as well as on our friends and allies, and to contribute to deterrence of non-nuclear attacks.

…Overall targeting planning appropriate to implementing a countervailing strategy will result in a capability to choose to put the major weight of the initial response on military and control targets.

…Methods of attack on particular targets should be chosen to limit collateral damage to urban areas, general industry and population targets…, consistent with effectively covering the objective target, and, where appropriate, overall plans should include the option of withholds to limit such collateral damage.

As the United States and the Soviet Union began to dramatically improve relations with Mikhail Gorbachev who became General Secretary of the Communist Party as well as the Soviet President, in 1985, public talk of a role for nuclear weapons faded well into the background. Although in 1983, a NATO military exercise named Able Archer 83 addressed NATO military commanders receiving permission from political leaders to launch the “initial limited use of nuclear weapons.” This exercise triggered a Warsaw Pact response (the Soviet led military organization which included Eastern European countries). A report concluded, “that Soviet Military leaders may have been seriously concerned that the U.S. would use Able Archer 83 as a cover for launching a real attack.” Certainly, any Soviet fears were still there by the time Gorbachev became leader less than two years later. Is it any wonder how Gorbachev managed to deal with military and political hardliners who carried the fear of nuclear use by NATO and felt the need to be as unbending as possible in dealing with both the United States and NATO. Gorbachev’s overtures to the Reagan Administration to reduce Cold War tensions must have been extremely difficult as he dealt with domestic factions who probably did not share his aims. By the time the Cold War ended, perhaps dating the end of the Cold War as August 1991, when Soviet hard-liners arrested Gorbachev, and this whole coup attempt failed, any discussion of a military or political use for nuclear weapons became verboten.  The post-Cold War years that followed never seemed to provide the appropriate setting to discuss nuclear weapons as anything but that they existed but remained well removed from military or political considerations.

This brief overview of some aspects of the United States and nuclear weapons, I think provides a broader perspective regarding how to look at whatever we can make of Putin and his maybe real/maybe not-quite-real nuclear threats as Russia stumbles badly in the Ukraine War.  The United States has had a long history of attempts to figure out a military and political role for nuclear weapons; the same was true for the former Soviet Union, as well Russia now. 

How do we understand any specter of nuclear use in the Ukraine War?  Is it simply a continuation of countries that have nuclear weapons constantly struggling with how to apply them in some concrete way, or should we see what is going on about the Ukraine War as an aberration?  Was there some new corner turned where suddenly something new is happening and we can expect more of this in the future?

One writer addressed the issue of “wormhole escalation.”  The author wrote:

Unlike traditional concepts of escalation, which suggest linear and somewhat predictable patterns from low-level crisis to all-out nuclear war, escalatory pathways in this new era of strategic competition will be less predictable. Indeed, increasingly sophisticated sub-conventional tactics such as disinformation and weaponized social media, the blurring of nuclear-conventional firebreaks, and the continuing diffusion of global power to regional nuclear states are adding new challenges and additional complexity to crisis management even as an increasingly competitive and contested security environment fuels greater coercive risk-taking among nuclear-armed states, in particular, the United States, Russia, and China.

There was a more structured nuclear gamesmanship (if that is the correct word to use) when there were two superpowers, just the United States and the Soviet Union: A Balance of Terror. In 2008 when Russia invaded the Republic of Georgia and a war of just a few days ended with maybe less than 500 deaths between the two countries, the Russian military looked formidable.  The current situation in the Ukraine War looks like a significant step backwards for any Russian military reputation. Putin's maybe/somewhat nuclear threats seem to be coming from a weaker position.

In the Korean War, sure North Korea mattered but regarding whatever nuclear threat might have been issued, the United States was dealing with China.  In the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, sure Cuba mattered but the United States was dealing with the Soviet Union.  In the case of the Ukraine War, more than Russia and the Ukraine are involved.  The United States has a role, but so do several European countries.  If a nuclear threat of any kind is issued by Russia, to whom is it being directed? 

On one level threats are aimed at Ukraine; submission to Russia in some way, exactly how is not clear. Russia wants Ukraine to recognize its rule over Crimea. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, but a territorial dispute still continues between Russia and Ukraine over this territory. In September, Russia annexed four areas in Ukraine. Two of the four areas have been the center of on-again, off-again fighting between Russia and Ukraine since 2014. While fighting, initially was between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian forces, Russia was seen as involved in a “stealth invasion” beginning in August 2014. One way to see the war as it began in February is as a continuation, but on an escalated level, from what has been ongoing since 2014. At times, Putin seems to have questioned Ukraine’s right to even exist as a country. If a nuclear threat is made, is it meant to bolster Russian aims to keep this territory or add more territory or, as he addressed in a televised speech several days after his forces began their invasion in February, that Ukraine is “historically Russian land” which certainly gets the message across that subjugation is the goal. Recently, Putin boasted that adding the four areas he annexed in September, which border the Sea of Azov was a long-time Russian goal and a dream of Peter the Great who ruled Russia at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries. Again, this gives the impression that his goals are broader than the four annexed areas and Crimea. Although the recent building of trenches and fortifying defensive positions in the Dunbar region (which encompasses parts of the four annexed areas) indicates that Russia has settled in for a defensive war, suggesting securing Putin’s hold along Ukraine’s eastern territory.

On another level Putin's nuclear threats can be seen as aimed at the United States where the intention is to try to get the United States to restrict the types of conventional weapons being sent to Ukraine, which they are already doing. In April, Russia sent a diplomatic note to Washington warning that continued United States support of Ukraine could lead to “unpredictable consequences.” With the United States set to deliver long-range Patriot ground to air missiles that will be used to shoot down Russian missiles, we will see how Putin responds. Drone attacks might increase significantly since the Patriot system is not capable of shooting them down.

On another level a message seems to be sent to European countries to back off in their support of Ukraine and to make sure NATO never allows Ukraine to join its ranks. The Czech Republic has sent T-72 tanks as well as armored personnel carriers, Poland has sent air defense weapons, and Germany has sent machine guns, hand grenades as well as ammunition. A Russian threat can be seen at both stopping weapons support as well as preventing membership in NATO. In dollar terms, the amount of military aid that has come from the Czech Republic, Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom total approximately $11 billion, contrasted with American aid that is exceeding $30 billion. Several other countries have contributed aid as well. No doubt this aid has changed how Putin now sees the conduct of the war and is willing to use threats to halt it. Added to Putin’s concerns is that Ukraine formally applied to join NATO in September 2022, seven months after Russia began its invasion.

I will add one more audience: Republicans in the House of Representatives. With the Republicans criticizing what they have seen as the Biden Administration having a blank check in delivering arms to Ukraine, Russia may want to stir the pot and use nuclear threats to essentially frighten Republicans to further increase their opposition to the Biden Administration having a free reign to supply arms to Ukraine. With the Republicans becoming the majority party in the House of Representatives beginning next month, will Russia develop an approach aimed at them: nuclear threats might be part of that. Russia has to be aware of a division within Republicans in Congress with Kevin McCarthy, likely to become Speaker of the House, expressing criticism of the Biden Administration and arms shipments and Senator Mitch McConnell, the Senate Minority Leader, expressing continued support for Ukraine.

With so many countries, and a particular American political party, being addressed by Russia, apparently wanting different things from each, is it even possible to reach a solution to ending the war on terms favorable to Putin and say a nuclear threat brought it about.  In both the Korean War and Cuban Missile Crisis, the goals were more precise:  nuclear threats, or rather the threat that both situations could escalate to become nuclear threats, had clearly defined ends. I am not sure I see clearly defined Putin war goals. Since he probably expected a quick end to the war, with his forces easily marching across the country, he has to now rethink what he wants.

In the case of the Korean War, negotiations had been dragging on since June 1951, with most major points toward ending the war agreed to, but then 1952 saw no progress and the issue of Prisoner of War (POW) exchanges needed to be addressed. Any nuclear threat by Eisenhower can be seen as focused on one final push to sign an armistice and cease military operations. Any nuclear threat that might have been indirectly issued to China through India in May maybe it played a role in having the armistice signed in July. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy wanted the Soviet missiles in Cuba removed and ships that were headed toward Cuba to turn around and head back to where they came from if they contained missiles or missile parts, and it was understood no Soviet missiles would ever be stationed on that island. The naval blockade set up in waters near Cuba, made that point clear to the Soviets. A Kennedy speechwriter, Theodore Sorensen described the situation as “the gun barrel of nuclear war.” Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, shortly after the crisis ended, in a meeting with a Czechoslovakian leader said, “this time we really were on the verge of war.” Careful steps were taken to keep the crisis controlled.

The Ukraine War is different which takes away any predictability and confidence that any escalation can be somehow controlled; there appears to be no precisely defined goal that a nuclear threat is expected to achieve, unlike the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The application of the wormhole escalation scenario seems to be appropriate with the threat of nuclear use hovering over the war.

The longer the war drags on, the more the level of death and destruction increases, if Ukraine increases and expands the targets inside Russia which are being hit with Ukrainian-made drones, which puts Ukraine in disagreement with the Biden Administration which does not want to see a widened war, and if Putin decides that annexing four territories is not enough, then where will we be. Putin making maybe/somewhat nuclear threats now may look very different than any nuclear threats that might be made as this war continues to unfold. His recent statements contribute to concern; recently stating, “such a threat is growing, it would be wrong to hide it.” Any continued/possible/maybe/real nuclear threats which can become a regular part of this war carry the increased risk of nuclear use. Suddenly, some threshold is crossed where a nuclear device can look like its use is inevitable. Russia does not have to feel backed into a corner to use a nuclear device, too many threats could create a situation where it seems like the next step and that is scary.

Notes

Joseph Cernik, “The Impact of Nuclear Threats on Crises Situations,” in Edward Lukes, ed., Essays on Current Politics and Government (Tampa, FL, Peal Publishers, 1980)

Joseph Cernik, “The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine,” in John Carroll and Colin Baxter, eds., The American Military Tradition: From Colonial Times to the Present (Wilmington, DE., Scholarly Resource Books, 1993)

Connor Echols, “Ukraine hits targets deep inside Russia in break with Biden administration,” Responsible Statecraft (December 6, 2022): https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/12/06/ukraine-hits-targets-deep-inside-russia-in-break-with-biden-administration/

Newt Gingrich, “Putin’s nuclear war is a real threat,” Washington Times (October 4, 2022): https:// www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/oct/4/putins-nuclear-war-is-a-real-threat/

Rebecca Hersman, “Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age,” Texas National Security Review, Summer 2020: https// tnsr.org/2020/07/wormhole-escalation-in-the-new-nuclear-age/

In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, United States Atomic Energy Commission (Wash., D.C., April 12, 1954—May 6, 1954), reprinted by MIT Press in 1971.

Inside Able Archer 83, the Nuclear War Game that Put U.S.-Soviet Relations on “Hair Trigger,” National Security Archive (December 6, 2016): https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/foia/2016-12-06/inside-able-archer-83-nuclear-war-game-put-us-soviet-relations-hair

Fedor Krasheninnikov, “Putin’s Goals in Ukraine and Their Consequences,” The Russia File, a blog of the Kennan Institute (February 16, 2022): https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-goals-ukraine-and-their-consequences

Walter Russell Mead, “Putin’s Nuclear Threat Is Real,” Wall Street Journal (October 3, 2022): https:// www.wsj.com/articles/putins-nuclear-threat-is-real-annexation-kremlin-west-imperialism-biden-ukraine-world-order-retreat-concessions-blackmail-11664824197

Presidential Directive/NSC-59 (July 25, 1980): https:// nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390/docs/7-25-80%20PD%2059.pdf. See also, “Jimmy Carter’s Controversial Nuclear Targeting Directive PD-59 Declassified,” National Security Archive (September 14, 2012): https:// nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390/

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 27, ISW, Institute for the Study of War (November 27, 2022): https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-27

Alexander Smith, “Putin’s ‘surreal’ version of Ukrainian history alarms experts,” NBC News (February 22, 2022): https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-russia-ukraine-history-speech-rcna17132

The Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60 POSTMORTEMS, National Security Archive (December 13, 2022): https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuba-cuban-missile-crisis-russia-programs/2022-12-13/cuban-missile-crisis-60?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=ee1f83a1-2c94-4d88-80bc-e884167df31f