Georgia: A Country We Should Pay Attention to as a Way of Understanding Putin's Threat to the West
American Eclectic posts articles twice a month, on the 1st and 15th. This is the third year of publication; previously published articles can be found on my site.
January 1, 2025
I spent the first five months of 2023 in Tbilisi, the capital of the Republic of Georgia. Much of my time was spent researching a paper on the impact of Russian emigres on the Georgian economy as they fled Russia to avoid being drafted to fight in Ukraine (Russia and Georgia share a border).
From numerous interviews, Georgia seemed to be progressing toward becoming democratic or more democratic; it is difficult to be precise as to what was developing. The Georgian Institute of Politics (which publishes excellent studies that can be found online) stated in one publication:
Georgia is currently at a crossroads of whether or not it will continue to pursue a democratic and European future. According to authoritative international platforms monitoring democracies around the globe, Georgia has begun changing rapidly from a semi-consolidated democracy to a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime.
People I spoke with from various occupations and Americans who have lived there for years addressed that they saw Georgia coming out of a dark past to a present that seemed to point to a better future. One American told me of staying in a hotel in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and after Georgia ended its years as one of the 15 Republics that were part of the then Soviet Union. She said that she walked into a room in the basement of the hotel, and as she stated, “There was blood on the floor, blood on the walls, blood everywhere, and body parts where it was difficult to tell what you were looking at.” She looked to her left and saw two men sitting there, obviously the killers. They looked at her, and she looked at them. She slowly backed out of the room and walked down the hall, hoping they were not coming for her. This was a period when several rival gangs were vying for city control. Another American told me of the significant police reforms that had taken place over the past 20 years, where bribery was the standard means of dealing with the police; now, he saw a professional police force. Another person said that during the 1990s, you would walk into a restaurant, and there was one rack to hang your coat and one rack to hang your guns.
Guns were everywhere during the 1990s. As one account of these years stated:
The streets aren’t safe like they used to be. Taxis are being held up, people are being robbed, many have guns now. The situation is not good.
In 2023, I walked everywhere. Never once did I feel threatened or concerned about my safety.
The Georgia I saw in 2023 had hope for the future. I frequently attended meetings of an American Chamber of Commerce organization, and optimism permeated these gatherings.
There were concerns; indeed, the arrival of more than 100,000 Russians (it is difficult to put an exact number on this) came to Tbilisi to avoid fighting in Ukraine. This is a city of one million, and a sizable Russian presence could be felt—particularly with an increased demand for apartments that led to a significant increase in rent prices (I heard that frequently).
Signs were everywhere showing a populace that supported Ukraine. Ukrainian flags were often flown alongside Georgian flags. Ice cream with “Support Ukraine” printed on the wrappers was sold everywhere.
I spoke with a bar owner who was so concerned about the Russian presence in the city that he had Russians sign what he called a “visa” that they opposed Vladimir Putin, the Russian Leader, and opposed the war in Ukraine before he let them drink in his bar. It was frequent in see where people spray painted on walls “Fuck Putin” or “We are not afraid of Putin.” Frequently, people would sit on the steps of the state security building and hold signs showing their support for Ukraine.
I walked through the crowd in February 2023 when protests erupted against the Georgian Parliament, which was considering a bill called the Agents of Foreign Influence Act, modeled after one passed in Russia. The three nights of protests, with crowds ranging between 63,000 and 68,000, were joyous, and the crowd's demographics ranged from young to old. Salome Zourabichvili, the President of Georgia, was not there, but she called in, and her remarks expressing her opposition to the act were heard over loudspeakers. Numerous police were positioned on side streets from where the protests occurred, but I saw no police action taken against protesters. In fact, I walked up to several police, and we exchanged pleasantries. This atmosphere was different from the police action that has taken place against recent protesters, with police beatings included.
The President has little power, although she can refuse to sign a bill preventing it from becoming law, but then that can be overturned with enough votes in the Parliament. The power resides with the Prime Minister. The Agents of Foreign Influence Act was eventually passed, and its impact is difficult to determine. However, the fact that it passed has cast a shadow over the country’s direction and the future of democracy. Zourabichvili was told that her term of office ended on December 29th and that she needed to vacate her office. In no uncertain terms, the Prime Minister, Iraki Kobakhidze, stated her options if she failed to vacate: "President Zourabichvili will have to leave office on Dec. 29. Let’s see where she continues her life – behind bars or outside. I believe she has enough sense to avoid violating the Criminal Code.” The drama built as Zourabichvili refused to leave office, calling the Parliamentary elections “illegitimate” and pushing for new elections.
Zourabichvili gave up the official residency and, sort of, the title of President. She has stated that she is the “legitimate” President or maybe, more broadly, the only legitimate government official as a way of discounting the status of the Georgian Dream Party’s right to rule. I suspect her calls for new parliamentary elections will continue to be a position she publicly pushes despite her essentially no longer being president. Zourabichvili will probably continue to be a thorn on the side of the Georgian Dream Party for the foreseeable future. It is uncertain how long public protests will continue in Tbilisi and how the government will respond. If Zourabichvili continues to forcefully denounce the elections and the right of the Georgian Dream Party to govern, expect more public protests. The United National Movement might be considered the second most viable political party. I have to wonder whether Zourabichvili might consider joining them and try to use her public status to increase their capability to become a serious challenge to the Georgian Dream Party. Overall, political parties in Georgia are a mess, with more than 200 of them.
In those first months of 2023, membership in the European Union (EU) seemed far in the future. However, in November of that year, the EU granted Georgia candidate status, a significant step toward membership. Georgia’s Prime Minister at the time, Iraki Garibashvili, said, “This is a historic day. This is a historic decision from the European Commission.”
Membership in the EU is seen as crucial to Georgia's economic future and a means of counteracting Russian influence. Georgian unemployment is seen as eventually being helped by membership. In 2022, the unemployment rate reached a high of 19.4 percent. In 2023, it began the year at 18 percent, falling to 15.3 percent in the last three months of that year. In 2024, the unemployment rate hovered at or just below 14 percent. EU membership might bring those figures farther down. The bar owner I spoke with said many people were leaving Georgia because of the unemployment rate. One of the reasons he was concerned about too many Russians taking up residency in Georgia was that their influence could grow if Georgians kept leaving the country to look for work elsewhere. Georgia’s population is under four million; however, a former high-ranking government official I spoke with told me that no accurate census had been taken in years, so whether that number is correct is debatable. If the population has shrunk or not grown or grown very little, that would indicate serious economic problems. I spoke with a cab driver who told me about his friends who went to Poland to drive cabs where they could make more money.
Wine is a prominent Georgian export (excellent to drink). But in 2022, for example, 58 percent of all wine exported went to Russia. EU membership would help Georgia diversify its export business, reducing its dependence on Russia as its prime customer. In 2019, Moscow said it would change its standards for accepting Georgian wine; this was a time of increased protests in Georgia against Russia after a Russian official was allowed to appear before the Georgian Parliament. A Russian with close ties to the government stated, “Why do we need Georgian wine? No one is going to die of thirst without these bottles on Russian Shelves.” Russia was using threats to express its dislike of the protests. Membership in the EU could remove some of the anxiety for this significant part of the Georgian export industry.
Tourism is another business that could be impacted by membership in the EU. Tourism is a big part of the Georgian economy. A bank president I spoke with discussed the appreciation of the lari (Georgian currency) during the tourist season. Russia makes up the most significant chunk of the tourist market: In 2022, Russians accounted for 15.2 percent of all tourists and 19.1 percent of all tourist dollars (using the US dollar, not the lari). EU membership might encourage more tourists from European countries in more significant numbers than currently visit.
Membership in the EU is seen as a way to counteract Russian influence and is not just seen in economic terms; Russia controls 20 percent of Georgian territory. In 2008, the Russo-Georgian War ended in five days, with perhaps 500 soldiers and civilians killed and Russian forces within a short distance of advancing into Tbilisi. Analysts point to the United States and NATO, essentially giving Putin the “green light” to invade Ukraine because they did next to nothing to confront Russia over this 2008 invasion. As one analyst put it:
The international reaction to Russia’s military campaign in Georgia was to prove remarkably muted, with Moscow suffering few negative consequences. On the contrary, EU leaders led calls for a ceasefire that appeared to favor Russian interests, while the US under the new Obama administration was soon calling for a reset in relations with the Kremlin.
After the war, Russia gained control of two sections in Georgia: South Ossetia, located in the middle of the country and just north of Gori, the birthplace of Joseph Stalin, and Abkhazia in the northwest, which borders the Black Sea. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia border Russia. Control of South Ossetia brought an odd development that began in 2015: The Russians periodically, usually monthly, have moved their fences that delineate their changing definition of South Ossetia territory. I went over this with a researcher at the Georgian Institute of Politics. She pointed out that the new territory that Russia now considers part of South Ossetia has been expanded to cover more than five football fields. A term has developed that now sees this Russian encroachment as a fact of life: Borderization. If negotiations to end the Ukraine War create a situation where Russia holds on to the territory in Ukraine it currently controls, will Russia adopt Borderization as a method of growing its presence in Ukraine?
Membership in the EU is not just about adding another member but economically benefits the countries that join. One study from 2014 stated:
[R]esults about the benefits countries derive from becoming EU members, using data from the 1980s and 2004 enlargements. There are substantial positive pay-offs, with a gain in per capita GDP of approximately 12%. Despite differences across countries, the evidence shows that the benefits of EU membership outweighed the costs for most countries – except for Greece.
A European Commission report in 2024 pointed to increased life expectancy for countries that joined the EU. As this report stated:
Over the past 20 years, the EU has made significant strides on social rights, health and environmental protection, waste management, consumer rights and product safety, among others, helping to improve the overall quality of people’s lives. The 10 countries that joined in 2004 have not only benefitted from these higher standards.
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) report from 2024 also praised the impact of joining the EU, referring to the 2004 enlargement that added Poland, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Hungary stating:
[T]he 2004 EU enlargement brought substantial income gains. These gains were particularly large in the new member states: after 15 years GDP per person was on average more than 30 percent higher than it would have been without EU accession.
A European Central Bank report noted a significant increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) in countries that joined the EU, contributing to economic growth.
The current problems in Georgia stem from the October 26, 2024, parliamentary elections that have been controversial. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) sent an election observation team. Parts of their report stated:
Contestants could generally campaign freely while campaign rhetoric and imagery was highly divisive. Reports of pressure on voters, particularly on public sector employees, remained widespread in the campaign. This, coupled with extensive tracking of voters on election day, raised concerns about the ability of some voters to cast their vote without fear of retribution.
…While most ODIHR [election observers] did not express significant concerns about the accuracy or inclusiveness of the voter lists before election day, some questioned the legitimacy of multiple registrations at the same addresses involving voters unknown to the actual residents. After election day, the opposition alleged the misuse of voter data, including that of citizens residing abroad.
The EU’s reaction to the election was more forceful. A month after the elections, the European Parliament stated, “[the elections] do not serve as a reliable representation of the will of the Georgian people.”
The Georgian Dream Party, the dominant political party that has controlled the Georgian government for more than a decade, reacted by announcing that the country was putting negotiations to join the EU on hold, which led to the protests that have received international attention.
When I was in Tbilisi, I constantly heard the name Bidzina Ivanishvili. Ivanishvili was a Prime Minister from October 2012 to November 2013. He is the country’s richest man, worth approximately $5-$7 billion (equal to 25 percent of Georgia’s Gross Domestic Product). A Transparency International report called Ivanishvili “the real ruler of Georgia.”
In April of this past year, Ivanishvili gave a speech indicating where the government was headed after the October parliamentary elections, which are now disputed. He said he was responsible for pushing for the Agents of Foreign Influence Act and stated:
The important decisions in this world are taken by the global party of war. It is this global force that first forced the confrontation of Georgia with Russia and then put Ukraine in even worse peril. NGOs [Nongovernmental Organizations] and radical opposition are acting on their behalf. The laws that we are proposing are there to expose those dark linkages.
Ivanishvili then addressed the United National Movement (UNM), which was formed in 2001 in opposition to the government of Eduard Shevardnadze, who was president from 1995 to 2003. Mikheil Saakashvili, the chairman of the UNM, served two terms as President. The UNM ruled for nine years, addressed reforms aimed at government corruption, pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, and even talked of joining NATO. However, while it ruled, it also displayed authoritarian tendencies, now seen as associated with the Georgian Dream Party. Ivanishvili’s irritation toward the UNM, perhaps more than that, is apparent in his remarks:
I know many of our supporters were dissatisfied that we did not punish the United National Movement enough. Even though many of their leaders spent time in prison and their leader [Saakashvili] is still in prison, it is true that we did not pass the UNM in a tribunal as such, did not condemn it as a treasonous, criminal entity that it is. Why did not we do it? Because we were under tremendous pressure. In fact, UNM was appointed the opposition [in 2012] just like they were appointed as government [in 2003] by the global party of war.
With the Georgian Dream Party coming to power in 2012, Ivanishvili as Prime Minister, power shifted from the President to the Prime Minister. The United States recently sanctioned Ivanishvili. The State Department, in its announcement of the sanctions, stated:
Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream’s actions have eroded democratic institutions, enabled human rights abuses, and curbed the exercise of fundamental freedoms in Georgia. Furthermore, they have derailed Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic future, a future the Georgian people overwhelmingly desire and the Georgian constitution mandates. The result has left Georgia vulnerable to Russia, which continues to occupy more than 20 percent of Georgia’s territory.
Notice that this statement does not refer to the current Prime Minister, Kobakhidze.
It is probably safe to say that Georgia, or the Georgian Dream Party, sought an excuse to halt its movement toward joining the EU. The European Parliament's statement that new elections are needed was simply an excuse to suspend negotiations leading to membership; another reason would have surfaced to do the same thing. Ivanishvili made his wealth from his years spent in Russia. Ivanishvili’s ties with Russia are still close, which cannot be discounted regarding their impact on the decision to halt negotiating regarding joining the EU. Interestingly, while Ivanishvili’s ties to Russia matter, when Ivanishvili came to power in 2012, one analyst noted that “[He] came to power with the full support of the United States and Europe.”
Five days after Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukraine began the process of applying for membership in the EU. One analyst stated, “EU membership would establish Ukraine firmly as an independent, sovereign European state. Not merely part of the Russian world." Whenever serious negotiations begin to bring the Ukraine War to an end, the incoming Trump Administration needs to make sure that giving Russia one of the things it wants—to prevent Ukraine from continuing to pursue a course to join the EU, is not a negotiable item.
Where Georgia is headed over the next few years is an open question. Ivanishvili’s full April 2024 speech is ominous and does not point to a future I saw in early 2023. Membership in the EU would benefit the Georgian economy, just as the Ukrainian economy could benefit from it. Membership in the EU can go a long way toward countering Putin’s influence.
I anticipate writing two more pieces on Georgia during 2025.
Notes
20 years together: Facts and figures about the benefits of the enlargement for the EU, European Commission: https://commission.europa.eu/20-years-together/20-years-together-facts-and-figures-about-benefits-enlargement-eu_en
Robert Beyer, Claire Yi Lu, Sebastian Weber, “The 2004 EU Enlargement Was a Success Story Built on Deep Reform Efforts,” IMF Blog (December 3, 2024): https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/12/03/the-2004-eu-enlargement-was-a-success-story-built-on-deep-reform-efforts
Bidzina Ivanishvili Backs Anti-Western Policies, Threatens Repressions, Civil Georgia (April 29, 2024): https://civil.ge/archives/602348
Anthony Blinken, “Sanctioning Georgian Dream Founder Bidzina Ivanishvili,” U.S. Department of State (December 27, 2024): https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-georgian-dream-founder-bidzina-ivanishvili/
Federico Carril-Caccia and Elena Pavlova, “Foreign direct investment and its drivers: a global and EU perspective,” European Central Bank/Eurosystem (April 2018): https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/articles/2018/html/ecb.ebart201804_01.en.html
Oliver Carroll, “War on the grapevine? Russia ups control on Georgian wine imports,” Independent (June 25, 2029): https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-georgia-wine-imports-protests-alcohol-trade-imports-a8972386.html
Fabrizio Coricelli, Luigi Moretti, Nauro Campos, “How much do countries benefit from membership in the European Union?” CEPR (April 9, 2014): https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/how-much-do-countries-benefit-membership-european-union
Peter Dickinson, “The 2008 Russo-Georgian War: Putin’s green light,” Atlantic Council (August 7, 2021): https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-2008-russo-georgian-war-putins-green-light/
Gabriel Gavin, “Georgia election was not fair and must be re-run, European Parliament concludes,” Politico (November 28, 2024): https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-election-was-not-fair-must-be-re-run-european-parliament-statement-membership-candidacy-eu/
“Georgia PM Demands Zourabichvili Resign by December 29,” MenaFN (December 23, 2024): https://menafn.com/1109022563/Georgian-PM-Demands-Zourabichvili-Resign-by-December-29
Georgia Unemployment Rate, Trading Economics: https://tradingeconomics.com/georgia/unemployment-rate
“Georgia’s Path to EU Membership: A Historic Recommendation,” GT Georgia Today (November 9, 2023): https://georgiatoday.ge/georgias-path-to-eu-membership-a-historic-recommendation/
“How could Ukraine become an EU member and what does Russia say?” BBC (June 24, 2022): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-61844552
Levan Kakhishvili, Shota Kakabadze, Salome Kandelaki, Nino Samkhara, Nino Kvirikashvili, Compendium of Policy Briefs, Georgia at a Crossroads Between Authoritarianism and Democratic Aspirations, Georgian Institute of Politics (June 2024): https:// gip.ge/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GIP-Krebuli-Eng_2024.pdf
Parliamentary Elections 26 October 2024, ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, (20 December 2024): https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/6/584029.pdf
Dato Parulava, Eva Hartog, and Gabriel Gavin, “The man who bought a country,” Politico (October 24, 2024): https://www.politico.eu/article/bidzina-ivanishvili-georgia-election-2024/
Peter Nasmyth, Georgia in the Mountains of Poetry (Richmond, United Kingdon, Duckworth, 2017)
Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili-the real ruler of Georgia and the architect of Georgia’s pro-Russian shift, Transparency International (29 May 2024): https://transparency.ge/en/post/oligarch-bidzina-ivanishvili-real-ruler-georgia-and-architect-georgias-pro-russian-shift